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■ Abstract Since the 1970s, supply augmentation strategies to meet water needs
have waned, and governments have increasingly focused on demand management
measures, including voluntary water transfers. Water demands have also changed as
expanding urban growth, changes in agriculture, and increasing concern for the en-
vironment compete for water. Water rights regimes based on queuing principles lead
to an inefficient allocation of water resources and may also result in other inefficien-
cies, such as overuse of land and inadequate adoption of capital-intensive conservation
technologies. Water trading based on transferable water rights has been advanced as a
solution to these problems. Trading helps equalize the marginal prices faced by vari-
ous water users, thereby providing information about the value of water in alternative
uses and creating compatible incentives. Putting water markets into practice introduces
real-world complications of transaction costs and third-party externalities. We present
these complications along with some major criticisms of water markets, and actual
cases of water trading are discussed. We conclude with avenues of potential future
research.
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SUPPLY AND DEMAND
The water-trading literature is voluminous, with a 1997 survey article (1) listing
over 200 works spanning the economic, legal, policy, and scientific dimensions
of water markets. This review, mostly of the academic and economic literature on
water markets, highlights major works and adds important recent contributions. We
make special reference to water marketing in the western United States, especially
in California.
A Brief History
From the late nineteenth century to the 1970s, water supply management in the
western United States (and in most semiarid agricultural areas across the world) has
been through heavily subsidized supply augmentation. The government increased
supply by building dams, reservoirs, and canals to capture surface runoffs and
deliver it to agricultural and urban users while also generating hydroelectric power
and providing flood control. Despite the prodigious resources needed to move
water through or over mountain ranges and across hundreds or thousands of miles,
water prices were kept low. Furthermore, demand for water has increased because
of expanding agriculture and growing populations. In the western United States,
about 80% of water used is used by agriculture, with the rest going to municipal
and industrial uses. Water sales often violate the economic law of one price, with
urban users regularly paying more than agricultural users, up to ten times more,
for water even after factoring in transaction, delivery, and treatment costs (2, 3).
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WATER MARKETS AND TRADING 241
The period since the 1970s has seen the policy of subsidized supply augmen-
tation replaced by an emphasis on better management and reallocation of existing
supplies. Hence, our analysis makes the simplifying assumption that existing sup-
plies are a binding constraint. The resulting water scarcity is what makes water
an “economic good.” Readers interested in historical analyses or engineering per-
spectives of water are directed to several good books (4–6).
Decomposing Water Use
Water analysts typically classify human use of water into agricultural and urban
use; however, current analyses make further differentiation. Agricultural use is
divided by agricultural output or crop. Urban use is divided into municipal and
industrial (MI) use, which is further split into residential and commercial use.
Some uses do not fit this classification easily. Instream flows are an environmental
use that is needed to sustain ecosystems and protect wildlife. Hydroelectric power
generation is sometimes classified as an industrial use and sometimes is its own
category. Recreation and transport uses are often left out of analyses. Researchers,
agencies, and governments vary in their usage of the above classifications.
Consumptive use vs nonconsumptive use is another important distinction. The
standard example of consumptive use is a farm irrigated by a nearby river. Crops
consume a fraction of the applied water via evapotranspiration; the remainder
might be a return flow to the river available for downstream users. One California
definition of “consumptive use” is applied water that cannot be put to further
use by downstream users, which includes water that drains to a saltwater body.
The standard example of nonconsumptive use is hydroelectric power, where all
the water used passes through to downstream users. Water applied to a farm that
percolates underground water (which can later be pumped out) is sometimes seen
as consumptive or nonconsumptive, a distinction important for trading (7).
Despite these complications, the term “water used” is sometimes applied with-
out clear definitions and too often must be understood (or guessed at) contextually.
Generally, and unless otherwise indicated in this review, water used refers to all
water applied to agriculture, without adjustment for return flows, plus all MI use.
Optimal Allocation
The socially optimal water allocation is one whereby the net output of a region
is maximized and is often conceptualized as the choice of a benevolent social
planner. In economics, the social optimum is termed Pareto efficient, an allocation
of resources (including compensating transfers of money) such that no person
can be made better off without making someone else worse off. A third way of
conceptualizing the social optimum is a situation in which all welfare increasing
trades and technology choices are implemented. The central economic result is
that the marginal values of water across all uses are equated. Economists call the
social optimum “efficient” because water is allocated to those who value it the
most.
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Despite criticisms by other disciplines against this economic approach, we posit
that the social optimum is the correct policy target, but the formation of the social
optimum involves subjective value judgments. Criticism among economists and
across disciplines generally is aimed at how water-use values are determined and
what uses are included. Economists have developed methods for determining the
economic value of water in various uses (8). Other researchers have questioned
the appropriateness of using a willingness-to-pay measure as the foundation of
value (9). Despite varying viewpoints, the consensus Dublin Principles, arising
from the 1992 International Conference on Water and Environment, recognized
both water’s scarcity and a need to effectively allocate it (10) as well as its essential
role in sustaining “life, development, and the environment.”
Regardless of discipline, any conception of the socially optimal allocation of
existing supplies seems to include three key changes from the current allocation.
First, early advocates of water reallocations identified water transfers from low-
valued agriculture to high-valued municipal and industrial uses as the principal
driver. Second, and more recently hypothesized, water transfers within agriculture
from low-value to high-value uses. Indeed, agriculture-to-agriculture transactions
comprised 20% of the trading volume of the 1991 California Drought Water Bank
(CDWB) (11) and 26% of water share trading in the Colorado-Big Thompson
Project area (12). Third, with trading driving up the price of water, investment in
water conservation technology should increase (13–15).
A Nonstandard Commodity
If water were a standard commodity, free-market allocation of resources would be
efficient and no regulation would be necessary. Water, however, is not a standard
commodity.
Because water is so ubiquitous, most analyses assume that water’s definition
and characteristics are commonly understood, and this assumption can lead to
confusion. As scientists like to remind us, water is neither created nor destroyed
but cycles through Earth’s hydrological cycle. Water policy addresses the scarcity
of usable freshwater, which obviously excludes saltwater but also excludes water
that is contaminated by naturally occurring and man-made materials and chemicals.
Usable freshwater is primarily available as precipitation, as surface water, or as
usable groundwater, although desalination is well established in many parts of the
world and being considered in San Diego and other parts of California (16).
Quantity is only one relevant dimension of water as a commodity. In this re-
view and in most papers, “water” refers to usable freshwater, measured in units
such as acre-feet (AF) or million liters (ML). Such a representation ignores that
precipitation and surface water are usually flows and not stocks, generally refer-
ring to a given quantity per year; 100 AF generally refers to 100 AF per year.
Second, not all water use is consumptive, and there is considerable value of non-
consumptive uses (e.g., hydropower generation and environmental benefit) as well
as further downstream use of return flows. Third, precipitation and surface flows
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WATER MARKETS AND TRADING 243
vary dramatically year to year because of weather conditions, and the reliability
of water availability usually conditions its value. Fourth, water quality matters,
with usability dependent on water’s specific application. Lastly, timing, location,
and elevation are critical because water is bulky and incompressible and cannot be
cheaply stored nor quickly transported large distances or elevations. These factors,
among others, make water different from the typical abstract characterization of a
commodity solely by its quantity. Oversimplification can lead to serious errors in
analysis.
Drought Response
Adding the complexity of weather variability, the socially optimal allocation of
water becomes a contingent allocation incorporating reallocation in drought years.
Unlike predictable long-term demand changes driven mainly by urban or agricul-
tural expansion, the suddenness of a severe drought supply shock eliminates most
technological adjustment options. In practice, water deliveries drop substantially,
with a larger drop to agricultural deliveries.
The social optimum would include two important features. First, within agri-
culture, some farms would reduce acreage rather than apply grossly inadequate
water, some farms would fallow fields, and some farms (for which inadequate wa-
ter would cause multiyear damage to crops such as trees and vines) would receive
nearly full water supplies. Second, aggregate agricultural use would decrease more
than aggregate urban use because urban use is relatively price inelastic. During
the 1991 CDWB, after decreased deliveries were implemented, trading consistent
with the above two predictions occurred (11).
Early Literature
Some of the early and often-cited advocates for voluntary water markets as a
means of reaching economic efficiency of water use were Milliman (17), Hartman
& Seastone (18), Vaux & Howitt (19), Howe & Easter (20), Frederick & Gibbons
(21), and Saliba & Bush (22). These authors carefully considered the concept of
third-party effects and transaction costs as factors complicating and limiting the
usefulness of water markets. Since their early advocacy, water trading has been
applied limitedly with concomitant research into transaction costs and third-party
effects that hinder the development of water markets. There has also been an
increased emphasis on the role of institutions, the distribution of benefits, and the
value of instream flows.
WATER RIGHTS AND PRIOR APPROPRIATION
Prior appropriation, the dominant water rights doctrine in the United States (23),
is a queuing system often summarized by the phrase “first in time, first in right.”
Before a river is fully appropriated, anyone can establish a water right by simply
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244 CHONG  SUNDING
appropriating, or using, water. If a river’s flow is overappropriated, senior rights
holders (those with earlier rights) get their full allocation prior to any allocation
to junior appropriators. Typically, agricultural users hold more senior water rights
(24). The warabandi water allocation system used in many parts of India and
Pakistan is a queuing system whereby priority is based on physical location rather
than seniority (23). This section introduces appropriative water-use rights and the
economic distortions they can produce. Several more detailed accounts of water
rights are available (25–27).
Major Provisions of Prior Appropriation
There are two major provisions that appear in prior U.S. appropriation settings:
“beneficial use” and “cancellation for nonuse.” Beneficial use states that a right is
only recognized if the water is put to a beneficial use such as agricultural or urban
use. This provision exists to prevent wasteful water use and prohibit speculation by
claiming rights without actual use. Cancellation for nonuse, also called forfeiture,
means that the right can be lost if the water is not used for a certain period of time,
typically five to ten years in the western United States.
Property rights to water are not equivalent to private ownership. In most coun-
tries, water is owned by the state, which grants use rights to private parties and can
put conditions on its use. In California, beneficial use requirements have changed
over time, reflecting increasing concern for the environment and changing regional
demands for water (25). For example, it is conceivable to mandate water efficiency
in agriculture, similar to existing urban water restrictions. In contrast, the prior ap-
propriation system in Chile does not apply beneficial use requirements nor does it
cancel rights for nonuse. Furthermore, Chile’s constitution grants the government
very little ability to regulate use (10).
Inefficiency of Prior Appropriation without Trade
Prior appropriation without trade provides poor incentives for conservation and
crop choice. Consider a stylized example under ideal textbook conditions of no
externalities or transaction costs. Suppose that a river has an average flow of
1 million AF; 850,000 AF of senior water rights are held by the agricultural (AG)
district, and 150,000 AF are held by the urban (URB) district, which may have
outside sources. With prior appropriation, allocation and pricing are not determined
in a market context. Figure 1 plots the demand curves for both sectors, labeled as
Dag and Durb,1. Without trade, the demand curves do not represent prices of given
quantities.
What are the prices and quantities in an average flow year without trade? In an
average year, points A and B represent the marginal value of water, $30 and $180,
in each sector at the prior appropriation quantities. However, actual prices may be
lower; prices are often set using the concept of cost recovery for an agricultural
or urban district. If the price set in AG is less than $30, the quantity demanded
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Qag Qurb
Price
$30
$300
850,000 AF 150,000 AF
$180
D ag D urb,1
A
B
D urb,2
B'
C C'
O
F F'E E'
Figure 1 Hypothetical demand (D) curves and allocations for agriculture (ag) and
urban (urb) water uses under growth and drought, trading and non-trading, and normal
vs increased demand scenarios. Durb1 and Durb2 represent hypothetical demands before
and after growth, respectively. Average allocation is 1 million AF with agriculture
receiving 850,000 with top priority. In a normal flow year, A and B are final allocations
of water without trading, whereas C and C′ represent final allocations and market
clearing prices with trading. With increased demand, A and B′ are final allocations of
water without trading, whereas F and F′ represent final allocations and market clearing
prices with trading. In a drought year with 850,000 AF of flow, A and O are the final
allocations, whereas E and E′ represent final allocations and market clearing prices
with trading. Abbreviation: AF, acre-feet.
at that price would be higher than 850,000 AF, and there would be an apparent
shortage. Furthermore, the last acre-foot used by AG is worth only $30, but the last
acre-foot used by URB is worth $180. Although these prices are hypothetical, they
are on the order of the price spreads for agricultural-to-urban transfers in southern
California (28). A voluntary trade between the two sectors would increase welfare
and lead to more economically efficient use.
A second inefficiency stems from distribution in the event of a drought. In a
hypothetical drought year, the river supply is 850,000 AF. URB would receive no
water from the river, even though it values water more, whereas AG would receive
its full allocation. In reality, such a distribution would probably not occur, but the
prior allocation property rights structure, absent trading, dictates such a result.
A third inefficiency comes from the response to urban growth. Suppose that
urban growth expands the demand of URB to Durb,2. The marginal value of water
increases to $300 at point B′, further increasing the potential gains from trade, but
the URB allocation remains fixed at 150,000 AF.
*Erratum
*Erratum (27 Nov. 2006): See online log at http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/errata/environ
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A final inefficiency has to do with conservation technology choice. Caswell
& Zilberman (13) have investigated modern irrigation adoption and linked it to
the price of water. Hence, absent trade, the low price of water may cause AG to
underadopt water-saving irrigation technology.
If trading is added (with the strong simplifying assumptions of no third-party
effects or transaction costs), the four inefficiencies above can be overcome. In an
average year, allocations and marginal market prices would be given by C and C′.
During a drought, both appropriators would share in the decrease in allocation,
with the equilibrium at E and E′. Urban growth would be accommodated with an
increase in URB use to F′ and a decrease in AG use to F. In each case, voluntary
trading achieves the social optimum, regardless of initial allocation and prices.
Hence, even if AG customers were charged a low price for water, their opportunity
cost would be the market price. This price would generate the correct incentives
for water conservation technology choices.
Transfers and Transferability
The National Research Council (29) defines a water transfer as “any change in the
point of or a change in the type or location of use.” Within this definition, transfers
have a wide range of complexity. The simplest transfer is within an irrigation
district. More complicated transfers are across districts but within a given river
basin. The most complicated transfers are interbasin transfers. There are several
types of water transfers including permanent water sales and temporary water
leases, discussed in a later section. Here, we focus on some basic property rights
issues.
To the best of our knowledge, water transfers in the United States and abroad
are all subject to some form of state approval and “no injury” rules that protect
third parties, although the strength of these rules vary widely. The protection is
usually in the form of the right to protest the transfer. Across states, the no injury
rules vary with respect to who has legal standing and the criteria used to determine
the claim. At a minimum, other water rights holders have standing to protest the
transfer, but many states allow private individuals or municipalities to initiate
protests. Recent trends indicate a broadening of the law to consider claims based
on public interest considerations, instream flow environmental protections, and
area-of-origin impacts. In some states, irrigation districts have the right to veto
out-of-basin transactions, and environmental groups are sometimes allowed to
petition for minimum streamflows (26).
There are exceptions to the transfer provisions discussed above. Federal water
project deliveries are subject to special rules that may make it difficult to transfer
water out of basin, but easier to transfer within basins (30). In Chile, the general
courts, rather than specialized water courts, hear injury claims and have been very
reluctant to mitigate potential effects of transfers, even if the government is the
protesting party (10).
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Other Regulations
Registration is another important regulatory concept. States today often require
that water rights must be registered to be valid. In the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, rights did not need to be registered, presumably because of
administrative difficulty coupled with abundant water. It was more efficient for
parties to seek a judicial decision when a conflict occurred. As water conflicts
became more common, most states (including California in 1914) required that
new appropriations be registered (25). Texas required, in 1967, that all unrecorded
rights holders formally file water rights claims, setting a deadline of two years
(31).
Also important in regulatory schemes is how the government handles environ-
mental flows. Historically, water rights have been given to appropriators only, and
instream use could not hold a water right. Instead, the state was able to enforce
minimal flow requirements, which become especially important during times of
drought. Although cutting an appropriator’s water allotment without payment is
conceivable and occasionally done, it is politically precarious and contrary to the
incorrect, yet popular, concept of water rights as property (32, 33). To increase
environmental flows, California has opted to establish an Environmental Water
Account with which it can purchase water from voluntary sellers (34).
Another form of regulation is with respect to water quality. Too little or too
much water use can lead to water quality degradation, altered stream return flows,
or decreased groundwater recharge. Coastal cities can also experience seawater
intrusion into groundwater aquifers (35). Too much water can cause waterlogging
(36, 37). Furthermore, point-source pollution, such as that coming from industrial
uses such as paper processing plants, may need regulation to protect downstream
users (38).
There are several other concepts used in prior appropriation regimes. An “ad-
judicated right” is a water right certified by a court process, which makes it easier
to trade. A “correlative right” is a water right that is tied together with other rights
that have equal priority claims. In times of supply shortfall, all correlative rights
holders have their supply decreased proportionately. An “appurtenant right” is a
right that is attached to the land and cannot be sold except together with the land.
Another water rights doctrine is that of riparian rights practiced in South Africa
and southern Australia, which both have functioning water markets (39). In such a
system, water-use rights are historically connected to land adjacent to watercourses.
In the case of a shortfall, rights are correlative, in that decreased deliveries are
spread to all users without regard to seniority.
Groundwater
Groundwater regulation attempts to combine open public access with management
when necessary. Historically, groundwater rights have been attached to the land
with an unlimited right to pump from the ground, as is the case in Texas (40).
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However, large groundwater withdrawals can result in subsidence and negative
effects on neighboring wells. In times of shortage or aquifer stress, legal rulings
have found that groundwater-use rights should be treated as correlative rights,
legalizing proportional limitations on pumping. In practice, governments and water
districts can place restrictions on well spacing, institute a permit process for new
wells, or limit the sale and export of groundwater (25, 41).
WATER MARKETS, MODELING, AND TAXONOMY
It is well understood in economic theory that under ideal textbook conditions,
markets and trading of a commodity lead to the socially optimal allocation and use
of the commodity, regardless of the initial allocation. Hence, starting with rights
allocated by a prior appropriation system, the introduction of trading, with the
appropriate adjustments for water’s nonstandard nature, would lead to the social
optimum. Water markets, operating like stock markets, have one price for water;
this single price would allocate water according to every agent’s demand curve;
and the single price would provide the correct benefit to be used in choosing
crops and evaluating water conservation technologies. Markets are favored over
alternative policies, such as command and control, because they are based on
voluntary participation and decentralized coordination through the single price for
water (18).
Markets are efficient, but the final allocation and how it is achieved are important
policy questions. What crops will be fallowed? Which counties will be sellers and
buyers? What will be the external benefits and costs? To answer these questions,
economists have built models to investigate the spatial patterns of water marketing
and its effects on cropping patterns, economic activity, and water conservation.
Empirical Models of Water Reallocation
In most arid regions of the world, agriculture is highly dependent on the diversion
of water resources for irrigation. At the same time, population growth, increased
industrialization, and, most importantly, heightened public awareness of environ-
mental benefits from enhancing instream flows are all exerting tremendous pressure
on federal and state agencies to reduce these diversions.
An adequate framework for understanding the reallocations of water resulting
from these forces requires consideration of several factors, including the following:
 Barriers to trade in water resulting from the water rights regime. Analysis
must be flexible enough to consider alternative implementation procedures
for water supply cuts, which vary allowable water trading and the regions
affected by water supply cuts.
 Heterogeneity in terms of cropping patterns, water availability, and produc-
tivity among regions.
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 Multiplicity in the responses to water supply reductions, including (a)
changes in land allocation among crops, (b) adoption of water conserving
practices, (c) use of groundwater, and (d) fallowing of lands.
Sunding et al. (42) developed a general modeling approach that incorporates
these features. The analysis nests three major empirical models of water use and
productivity, specifically applying them to California. The modeling framework
provides various measures of economic impacts, including impacts of supply cuts
on producers’ surplus, producers’ revenue, state product, employment, and irri-
gated acreage. Furthermore, recognizing the large uncertainty regarding producers’
behavior and water productivity in crop production, differences between responses
in the short run and the long run, as well as data and computational constraints, the
empirical analysis does not rely on one comprehensive model that incorporates all
aspects of the problem at hand.
The modeling framework consists of a microeconomic model of resource al-
location by the irrigated agricultural sector. Optimization is conducted subject to
water supply reductions and economic relationships that provide additional assess-
ment measures, including estimated impacts of supply response on employment
and gross regional product. The model recognizes the heterogeneity of producers
by assuming that production is carried out by a number of microproduction units
of various sizes. Such units may be interpreted as farms, water districts, or counties
depending on the application and the data available. The model also accommo-
dates barriers to trade and transfers of water between microunits. Indeed, water
rights regimes, such as the prior appropriation system and riparian rights systems,
restrict trading. One major feature of a policy reform is the extent to which water
trading is allowed.
Following theory and empirical evidence, researchers suggest that farmers can
respond to reductions in water supply by (a) changing land allocation among
crops, (b) increasing the amount of groundwater pumping, and (c) modernizing
their water application methods (15, 43–45).
The impacts of reducing agricultural water supplies vary with the planning
horizon. The immediate impacts of supply reduction may differ from longer-run
impacts because in the short run growers’ flexibility is much more limited. Pro-
duction function parameters, water availability, and costs are subject to much vari-
ability and randomness. Ideally, an impact assessment model should be versatile
and comprehensive to generate various types of impact estimates. Unfortunately,
a model that accounts for heterogeneity among growing regions and all dimen-
sions of grower response to water supply changes does not exist and would be too
computationally costly or data intensive to model. Instead, Sunding and cowork-
ers (42, 43) obtain policy impact estimates from three models, each emphasizing
a different aspect of agricultural water use. The results of these various models
provide a range of impacts within which the actual outcomes are likely to lie.
The models measure the impact of several policy scenarios that have three basic
dimensions. The first dimension of the policy change is the level of the water supply
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available to the agricultural sector. The second dimension is the allocation of the
aggregate cutback among water users. In practice, the final allocation of the supply
reduction is an open question, depending on which state or federal agency takes
responsibility for the decision. Third, the extent of water trading is considered a
policy choice.
The three models considered by Sunding et al. (42) are the California Agricul-
ture and Resource Model (CARM), the agroeconomic model, and the rationing
model. The CARM was developed to predict profit-maximizing farmers’ short-run
acreage and production responses to changing market conditions or resource con-
straints (46). The model divides California into 14 regions that are homogenous
in terms of their agronomic conditions, microclimate, and resource costs. Each
region has a set of cropping activities that is drawn from a set of 34 crop types and
corresponds to the observed annual crop data recorded by the county agricultural
commissioners. Each crop has an average yield function, a calibrated quadratic
cost function, and Leontief input requirement coefficients for land, irrigation water,
nitrogen, fuel, and labor. The resulting model is a calibrated quadratic program-
ming model with quadratic functions for both the regional crop supplies and the
statewide output prices.
The CARM objective function can be shown to maximize the sum of producer
and consumer surplus from California agricultural crop production. The model
has regional constraints on land, water availability, and some crops that are sold
through predetermined contracts. The shadow values on these constraints enable
the model to generate estimates of the regional opportunity costs of land and water
resources in excess of the fixed charges for these inputs. By changing the regional
availability of surface irrigation water and restricting the farmer’s ability to substi-
tute groundwater, the effects of alternative implementation methods for the water
reallocation can be modeled and compared with the outcomes of other models.
The agroeconomic model has the least detail in terms of number of crops and
regions but has the most advanced specification of water productivity. This specifi-
cation allows investigation of the impacts of water supply reductions on irrigation
technology choices under alternative scenarios, and it also enables adjustment
of predicted water use and technology choices to variations in weather and land
quality.
The rationing model measures immediate impacts from changes in water supply
policy and relies on the most detailed microlevel data. The basic unit of the rationing
model is the individual water district. In California, the water districts are grouped
into five regions according to their proximity to various federal Central Valley
Project (CVP) facilities and have similar water rights and growing conditions. The
model also captures the largest number of crops among the three impact models
and is the only model to include both annuals and perennials.
Growers in the rationing model respond to reductions in surface water availabil-
ity by ceasing production of the crops with the lowest marginal value of applied
water. This approach is motivated by the fact that growers have a large degree
of flexibility when they make long-term decisions regarding irrigation technology
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and cropping patterns but have only limited flexibility in the short run. In this
respect, the model is based on the “putty-clay” approach to water policy modeling
of Green & Sunding (47).
All of the models considered suggest that the incremental costs of reducing
agricultural water supplies increase sharply as the quantity reallocated increases.
Modeling results suggest that the overall level of the water supply cut is not the most
important factor affecting the social cost. Rather, the impacts depend critically on
the extent of a water market and, when trading is limited, on how supply cuts are
distributed among regions.
Transitioning to Water Markets
These models predict who participates in water trades, how scarce water should be
reallocated, and what the hydrological and socioeconomic impacts are. The nature
of the transition to water markets is an empirical inquiry that can be answered
only with actual data, not models. Critical questions include what water is traded,
who trades, and how do communities adjust. The function of actual water markets
during nondrought conditions has been studied, among other places, in California
(41, 48), Australia (49), South Africa (39), and Chile (10), with markets emerging
in the last 25 years in all of these locations. In these four regions, empirical evidence
generally supports the idea that water is traded from low-value uses to higher-value
uses.
Two of the most important questions in water markets are
 What constitutes a successful water market?
 What rules and institutions are most appropriate to address the transaction
costs and potential third-party effects of trading?
Despite the tremendous potential of water trading to increase social welfare, that
water is a nonstandard commodity puts special conditions on what a water market
should be. To many, the ideal water market would function like a stock market,
where stocks are freely traded with few restrictions. Instead, and as suggested by
the National Research Council (29), the key hurdle to water trading is to permit as
much trading as possible while still addressing the externalities of trading.
Hence, there is an inherent link between tradability of water and the complex-
ity of externalities. Furthermore, the success of a market should not be measured
by the number of trades. In Californian, large-scale interbasin trades, which have
had complex third-party effects, have required lengthy multistakeholder bargain-
ing (41), whereas the active trading in Australia’s Murray-Darling Basin (49) has
been easier because of fewer third-party effects. The intuitive argument that one
market functions better than the other because it has more transactions ignores dif-
ferences in trading context. These differences in context and the varied approaches
to addressing them are discussed at length below.
The function and dynamics of water market trading need to be better understood.
Transfer water can be generated from the implementation of water conservation
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technology, permanent fallowing, seasonal fallowing, or shifts in crop choice. In
the one large California transfer involving the Palos Verdes Irrigation District,
fallowing was almost entirely of alfalfa, a low-profit, low-labor crop (41). Most
studies are ex ante projections of the value of trading that are used to justify
changing rules to allow for more trading. More systematic ex post studies of the
changes in cropping patterns are needed.
Studies have also suggested that trading participation is not based on financial
considerations alone. In studying the characteristics of buyers, sellers, and non-
traders in Australia, Bjornlund (50, 51) found several differences, including farm
size, capital intensity, and family/farm structure, echoing existing research on the
heterogeneity of irrigation technology choices (14).
The question of area-of-origin impact is especially important. Models give a
static impact, an important measure, but one that ignores adjustment. Of poten-
tially greater significance are the speed with which a community can adjust to an
economic shock and the mitigation measures that can ameliorate the transition.
Potential mitigating measures include community development investments and
job training. The authors are unaware of any empirical articles on this topic.
Types of Water Transfer Arrangements
Aside from permanent sales and short-term leases, many innovative water transfer
arrangements exist (52). Callable water-use options allow a city to lease water
under specified drought conditions. Water leasebacks, popular in Colorado, are
arrangements in which a municipality purchases the right and then leases the water
back to agricultural users in nondrought years. Water right priority exchanges can
shift the drought-year allocation queue. Banking water artificially stores water,
often imported water, in underground aquifers during wet years to be pumped out
during dry years. This is not to be confused with water banks, which are brokering
institutions.
The 1991 California Drought Water Bank (CDWB) is one of the most studied
cases wherein water markets and trading were used for allocation during a drought.
Creating a brokered market at a set price, the CDWB purchased 821,045 AF of
water though one-year leases of water that was supplied predominantly by crop
fallowing and groundwater substitution. The resulting water was available for
large-scale interbasin transfer and was credited with averting shortages of critical
needs for agriculture and urban use (11).
IMPERFECT MARKETS: TRANSACTION COSTS AND
THIRD-PARTY EFFECTS
As discussed above, water markets and trading deviate from an ideal textbook
market because of third-party effects and transaction costs, which arise out of
water’s unique properties. These complications do not preclude the possibility
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of a well-functioning and socially beneficial water market. Water economists,
lawyers, and policy analysts have spent much of their efforts identifying these
complications, debating their severity, and discussing how they can be addressed.
Water markets require transferable water rights. Not only do these rights need
to be separated from land, but the rights must be clear so that the buyer and seller
of a right understand what is being traded. The lack of clarity in property rights
creates disputes that must go through costly court proceedings with unpredictable
outcomes. One researcher describes the conditions necessary for beneficial intro-
duction of markets succinctly: “the entitlements of all users under all levels of
resource availability [need to be] defined” and “third-party impacts (in quality,
quantity, time, and place) [need to be] be identified” (9).
Water availability depends not only on the behavior of nature, but also on other
users who can affect water availability and water quality or protest a transfer.
Rights holders may not use their full allocation every year, leaving water for junior
agricultural or municipal users. The behavior of upstream users can also affect the
quality of water; return flows may carry additional chemical load. The schedule
of releases by dam operators and seasonal environmental constraints affect when
water is available for downstream users.
Third-Party Effect: Environmental and Instream Flows
Fisheries and the environment depend on water flow and quality; fisheries and the
environment do not typically hold water rights, partly because their use is noncon-
sumptive. Until recently, instream flows were not recognized appropriative rights
in California (41). Environmental legislation and litigation, based on the Endan-
gered Species Act or the Clean Water Act, can supercede and create minimum flow
requirements, but the negotiation and regulatory process is not clearly defined, and
outcomes are unpredictable (53, 54).
Flows may also be important from a water quality or hydrological perspective.
Flowing water provides the environmental service of pollution dilution. Water use
can also introduce problems of water salinity and drainage, as was the case in the
Tulare basin of California’s Central Valley (52, 56, 57). Trades out of this basin
could have a positive drainage externality. Saltwater intrusion can result when net
withdrawals from an aquifer are too high (47).
Third-Party Effect: Other Rights Holders and Downstream Use
Other rights holders may also be affected by water trading, either by a decrease
in quantity or by some other effect. The most-used example is that of downstream
users. In one case, a downstream irrigation district protested an upstream agricul-
tural trade. The court-decreed resolution limited the transfer amount to existing
agricultural consumptive use (18). The main drawback of using consumptive use as
a benchmark is that heterogeneity, such as local soil conditions, can greatly affect
water use, causing inaccurate estimates based on average consumption. In fact, one
study found that estimated consumptive use, based on acres planted multiplied by
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estimated water use by crop, exceeded total water use in several irrigation districts,
casting doubt on the use of estimates (57).
There may be other, potentially complex, effects on downstream users. In Chile,
a paper mill generated water pollution, and the river’s flows were sufficient to dilute
the pollution by the time it reached a downstream municipal water supply. Proposed
construction of a dam and diversions upstream would have decreased the flow such
that the water reaching the municipality would have been too polluted (10). Dams
can also affect the timing of water releases: dam operators prefer to release water
in the winter, when energy prices are high, which is in direct conflict with farmers
who need water during the growing season (10).
Socioeconomic Area-of-Origin Effects
There are multiple forms of socioeconomic area-of-origin effects. The first effect,
which is intensively studied and modeled by economists, involves the forward and
backward linkages to other county activity. Decreased farm activity eliminates
farm employment and decreases sales for supporting businesses. The modeling of
regional outcomes is quite central to policy evaluation, the design of appropriate
mitigations, and the political sensitivity of a trade.
A second effect is the potential breakdown of the local community. Decreased
economic activity erodes the tax base, and a smaller base of farmers must pay
the fixed costs for maintenance. If farm activity declines substantially, supporting
businesses may close, making it more difficult for the remaining farmers. Vacant
lands may develop noxious weeds or soil erosion and may create the psychological
atmosphere of a city in decline, which becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy (25, 29,
58, 59). The existence of area-of-origin effects is not debated, but the severity of
the effect is highly contested.
Third-Party Effect: Groundwater-Surface Water Interaction
During the 1991 CDWB, 33% of water traded came from groundwater substitution.
Instead of fallowing, a farmer or irrigation district was able to trade entitlements
to surface water and pump water for irrigation. Groundwater is often a limited
resource; overextraction leads to declines in the water table and increased pumping
costs. Monitoring programs were used to ensure that local groundwater basins
were not adversely affected. The short duration of the bank’s existence curtailed
any significant impacts (60).
Surface water recharges groundwater aquifers, a fact well known to economists
and water engineers but not integrated well into water law. Laws in many states
treat groundwater and surface water law differently, compounding the incomplete
understanding and fragmented management of many underground aquifers. As a
result, groundwater trading becomes difficult.
One type of transfer, groundwater banking, exploits the groundwater-surface
interaction by artificially recharging aquifers and then using them as underground
storage reservoirs. Southern California and central Arizona have carefully
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addressed the legal questions of groundwater rights before ultimately implement-
ing groundwater banking projects (34, 61, 62).
Legal Costs
Conflicts arise in water trading because of competing claims or claims of third-party
injuries. Subjecting each conflict to a court or administrative hearing would be a
high-cost method of resolution. Establishing clear criteria for approving transfers
and predictable procedures for resolving third-party compensation claims would
lower the cost of resolution (63).
The ease of transfers varies greatly. As discussed above, the broadness of the
transfer approval criteria (i.e., regulatory procedures, what third-party claims are
valid, and who has legal standing to protest) increases the transfer difficulty.
Another major issue is whether the rights have been adjudicated. In the lower
Rio Grande region of Texas, adjudication of competing river basin claims took
15 years to resolve (31). Although costly in time and money, the resulting claims
are clear and precise, precluding legal disputes and generating an active regional,
intrabasin transfer market. In contrast, interbasin transfers bring a broader review
for third-party impacts, explore uncharted legal ground, are more controversial,
and are hence less common. Even without significant third-party effects, three of
California’s larger transfers took several years to negotiate (41).
The absence or advance settling of third-party effects is a common feature in
active regional water markets. Shares in the Colorado–Big Thompson Project area
are largely protected from third-party claims (12). The lower Rio Grande has court-
mandated correlative rights, and because the subbasin drains directly to the ocean
with no groundwater effects, there are no downstream rights holders to file claims
(31).
Explicit Barriers to Trade
In the United States, one of the greatest barriers to water trading is federal water.
Of 42 million AF used annually in California, 7 million AF is from the CVP and
subject to the rules of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. During the 1991 California
drought, the CVP water was excluded from water trading by the federal authorities
who had a long-standing policy of not allowing trades out of the project. In 1992,
the CVP Improvement Act was renewed, after considerable political maneuvering,
with reforms that allowed trading with highly restrictive conditions (3, 64).
In individual irrigation districts, trading of water rights by individual farmers is
constrained by the district. In California, water rights are held by farmers, although
the district typically holds the permit for physical diversion or the contract for
State Water Project deliveries. Water districts, which have independent, elected
governing structures, often preclude their members from engaging in potentially
profitable out-of-district trades. In current practice, out-of-district trades require
careful negotiations on the level of the district governing body (26, 65).
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Infrastructure Costs and Constraints
Trading cannot occur if water cannot be transported. In California, considerable
expense has gone into the construction of the State Water Project (linking north-
ern and southern California) as well as the Colorado River Aqueduct (linking
the Colorado River to Los Angeles). Even with adequate infrastructure, the con-
trol and constraints of infrastructure can complicate trades. An interesting situa-
tion occurred in 1998 when a San Diego-Imperial Irrigation District deal needed
to transport water through the Metropolitan Water District’s infrastructure. The
Metropolitan Water District initially quoted a rate of $262 per AF for wheeling, or
transporting, the water. This was about three times what San Diego was expecting
and effectively doubled the purchase price (4).
New infrastructure is often needed to facilitate trading. In California, many
central coast cities are not adequately connected to the state’s extensive water dis-
tribution network. In California, water transfers from northern California to central
California are currently limited by ecological constraints of the San Francisco Bay
delta (53, 66). Infrastructure costs are substantial and may considerably decrease
the potential gains from water trading.
Political and Social Barriers
Even when all third-party effects are addressed adequately, there exist political
and social barriers to water markets. Considering that water markets are meant to
be more economically efficient, the gains from the transition should be sufficient
to make all parties at least as well off. However, deciding on a distribution of
gains is quite difficult. In practice, multiple stakeholders (often framed as farmers
vs cities) must agree on the rules governing trades and have trade-enabling laws
passed (3). One concern raised has been that all the gains accrue to the landowner at
the expense of tenant farmers. The complications for developing countries (where
water trading can be seen as conflicting with social equity, basic access to water, and
the livelihood of poor farmers) frame the development of effective water trading
institutions (67, 68).
FOUR CURRENT DEBATES
Four current arguments against water trading are central to current research and
debate.
Argument 1: Water Markets Mean Reallocation
from Agricultural to Urban Uses
A popular perception of water markets is reallocation from agricultural to urban
uses. In practice, the evidence is mixed. During the 1991 CDWB, agricultural
transactions comprised 20% of its temporary water sales. In the Colorado–Big
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Thompson project area, approximately 26% of water trading was within agricul-
ture. A recent report on a comprehensive data set of California transfers from
the 1980s through 2001 shows a mix of buyers. In 2001, a somewhat dry year,
about a third of the water transfers were to the environment, and about one fifth
of the transfers were to municipal and industrial users, with the rest going pre-
dominantly to farmers (69). Although these numbers do imply significant urban
transactions, they demonstrate that water reallocation within agriculture can also
be quite significant.
Trading in the Murray-Darling basin of Australia demonstrates the significance
of trading within agriculture. There, urban growth centers currently have adequate
supply or are physically separated from the basin, hence trading to urban uses is
virtually nonexistent. Despite this, an active market exists in reallocating water
within agriculture, with the flow of trade from low-value grain to higher-value
crop/wine producing areas (70).
There are several reasons why large agricultural-to-urban transfers of water are
not more prevalent. Lack of infrastructure and high conveyance costs limit transfers
to growing urban areas. Furthermore, operational rules often limit transactions. In
the United States, federal water trading rules have, until recently, explicitly lim-
ited trade as well as discouraged it by prohibiting profit making (64). Transactions
within agricultural districts do not generally require approval and are thus much
easier than heavily scrutinized, interbasin, agricultural-to-urban transfers. Many
counties in California have moved to restrict water exports, especially of ground-
water (65).
Some large agricultural to urban transfers have occurred. Los Angeles pur-
chased the water rights of Owens Valley between 1905 and 1934. The Imperial
Irrigation District negotiated two long-term transfers in 1988 and 1998, trans-
fering 100,000 AF and 200,000 AF, respectively, to southern California water
districts. This water was generated by canal lining and fallowing. Urban purchases
have also been significant in Texas’ Rio Grande area, northern New Mexico, and
central Arizona (29, 40).
Argument 2: Transfers Result in Large Economic Losses
for Areas of Origin
Water trading is easier and more prevalent within basins, but researchers have long
identified potential gains from out-of-basin trades. Concerns over area-of-origin
impacts are frequently raised.
This perception began with the infamous Owens Valley transfer, whereby
Los Angeles secretly purchased the water rights of an agricultural area between
1905 and 1934. As a recent reanalysis of the transaction emphasizes (71), sellers
were paid more than their land was worth agriculturally but much less than the
buyer’s value of water. This distributional asymmetry contributed to the negative
legacy of the transfer. Ignored in the analysis, but perhaps more significant, are
the effects on third-party businesses and employment. The transfer ended irrigated
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agricultural production in the area and had widespread community effects with no
gains to nonlandowners. The Owens Valley transfer is not representative of most
transfers.
Local effects of water exports are real, but results depend on the response
of water sellers. An ex post evaluation of the CDWB concludes that statewide
transfers increase total welfare, but locally, there were some negative effects (72).
More recent calculations for the Central Valley predict an impact of $170,000
of net income loss and eight job losses per thousand AF traded. This figure was
derived from modeling a hypothetical transfer of one million AF out of agriculture
(73). The modeling presents a static one-period picture; over time, areas will adapt
in ways similar to the adaptation of cities to industrial plant closures (12).
The net local effect is not necessarily negative. If farms are temporarily fallowed,
impacts may be short lived, as evidenced by the CDWB. For longer-term transfers,
the local effect of water trades largely depends on the response of the farmers
selling water. Theory suggests that “income flight” out of the area of origin would
lead to negative local effects, whereas income reinvestment could lead to local
welfare improvements (74).
The area-of-origin impacts can be accommodated by several measures. First,
compensation can be provided, as was done by the creation of mitigation funds for
some recent California projects (65). Cities can plan for the transition by diversi-
fying the local economy or other coping mechanisms, as was the case with the city
of Blythe, California (41, 58). Others argue that negative transitions due to transfer
are realized slowly and that change is an inherent risk of doing business, so the need
for compensation may be limited (75). Second, caps on traded volume in a given
year have been advocated and adopted. In Australia, there is a nationwide transfer
cap. Individual irrigation districts, which hold effective veto power of transfers,
also institute caps (70). A suggestion from the early literature of a 15% cap on
transfers seems reasonable (72). Third, to address local government funding con-
cerns resulting from urban purchase of farms and subsequent fallowing in Arizona,
water purchases make in lieu municipal tax payments, and the state government
can adjust local government funding to account for water trade effects (26, 76).
Argument 3: Interbasin Trade Should Be Prohibited Because of
Large Hydrologic Effects
Many raise concerns about interbasin trades and their effect on hydrology. In-
complete understanding of water systems limits the precision of mitigation and
management, but institutions can be formed to deal with hydrological concerns.
Groundwater is an area of particular interest. The California Department of
Water Resources uses a concept called “paper water,” which is “water proposed
for transfer that does not create an increase in the water supply” (7). California law
is vague about transfers of water that otherwise would percolate to underground
aquifers (which can be pumped later), but the Department of Water Resources
generally considers such water to be paper water. Water trading obviously affects
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groundwater recharge, but the change is not necessarily negative. Using an inte-
grated hydrological-economic model, researchers concluded that water trade could
lead to both increases and decreases in groundwater nitrate concentrations (38).
Of more practical concern, groundwater overdraft can result in seawater intrusion,
which is of great concern for several coastal California cities (35). Insofar as coastal
imports substitute for coastal groundwater pumping, trading can be hydrologically
beneficial.
A behavioral hydrological consequence is the trading of previously unused
water. In California, paper water includes water rights that are not always fully
used. In Australia, such rights are termed “sleeper rights,” and the activation of
such rights means a larger use of water than in previous years.
Mitigations that can address these hydrologic concerns include restricting trade
to consumptive use and effective joint regulation of groundwater and surface water.
However, restricting trade to consumptive use has technical complications, such
as the spatial and temporal variation of consumptive use, and would still need
to be adjusted on a case-by-case basis. Court and administrative procedures to
protect against adverse groundwater and return flow effects produce unpredictable
ad hoc results. Interbasin trades currently require substantial negotiation and face
potential litigation but can result in welfare-improving trades.
Argument 4: Water Is a Public Good and Should Not
Be Subject to Market Forces
Whether water should be treated as a commodity is perhaps the most contentious
debate within the water trading literature. The bulk of this review and the water
economics literature has been in support of water markets (with the general mes-
sage that, under appropriate preconditions, the creation of voluntary water markets
can achieve the social optimum of economic efficiency). This viewpoint empha-
sizes the private good qualities of water. Critics have pointed to three arguments
emphasizing the public good qualities of water.
1. Values used in defining economic efficiency are flawed. Values based on
willingness to pay are skewed against those lacking ability to pay, the poor.
Market mechanisms emphasize the need to reallocate to high-value uses, and
most discussions skip over the need for water management to provide clean
water, along the lines of the UN Basic Water Requirement, to all people
(9).
2. Inadequate attention is given to preconditions needed for effective water
markets. As discussed above, market advocates are concerned about third-
party impacts. The environmental economics literature has a long tradition
of studying externalities, emphasizing the need for effective mechanisms to
solve the resulting water conflicts. Conflict resolution depends on laws and
institutions. In the western United States, state regulatory agencies or special
water courts provide mechanisms to address these impacts (25), but not all
places provide effective mechanisms (10).
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3. The use of economic efficiency as the sole criteria is incorrect. Integrated
water resource management balances three principles: economic efficiency,
social equity, and the environment. The tendency within economics is to
treat the latter criteria as part of economic efficiency, introducing external
constraints on the market. However, the social equity of small farmers and
tenant farmers (who do not own the water rights) can be seen as inadequately
addressed. The market context accounts for environmental externalities only
insofar as the institutional rules can address them. In the United States, with
the Environmental Species Act, pollution regulation, and the participation
of multiple stakeholders, institutions do integrate environmental values into
the regulatory framework. In Chile, in contrast, government jurisdiction is
unclear, and environmental regulatory power is difficult to apply; the envi-
ronment is effectively an institutional afterthought to strong property rights
(10).
The Dublin Principles, formulated at the 1992 International Conference on Wa-
ter and the Environment, established a common understanding of water’s scarcity
and the importance of managing it as an economic good, but only as one of its four
principles. In the western United States, where agricultural, urban, and environ-
mental stakeholders are actively engaged in developing the operational rules for
water management, appropriate institutions have developed. One author, indirectly
remarking on the problems with Chile’s laissez-faire water law development, cau-
tions (10), “Countries and governments should not make the mistake of thinking
that they can implement reforms in two steps, by first adopting a free market ap-
proach to water economics as a straightforward initial step, and then turning their
attention to the remaining problems of the IWRM and water governance. At that
later point their hands will already be tied by a definition of property rights that
has major political and institutional implications.”
The end result is not to invalidate the usefulness of water markets. Instead,
the criticism highlights that water markets are not sufficient to address all prob-
lems and that attention must be paid to water’s unique and public good char-
acteristics. Those who caution against haphazard market formation are not nec-
essarily opponents; once basic uses of water (human and environmental water
needs) are met, water markets are an efficient mechanism for dealing with the
scarcity of the remaining elective uses of water. The prognosis is that water mar-
kets need appropriate, effective institutions, and models that recognize the public
good qualities of water, incorporate transactions costs, and address third-party
externalities.
CONCLUSION
Although the authors endeavored to make broad comparisons between currently
functioning markets, that task was beyond the scope of our time and ability. In par-
ticular, it became apparent that each area had unique circumstances that framed the
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development and function of water markets. Instead of a cross-country synthesis,
our aim has been to present an analytical framework that recognizes and models
the potential for water markets to address the problem of water scarcity while
identifying the myriad complications of transaction costs and third-party effects.
Considerable progress has been made in the literature as markets have moved from
theory to practice. Although we have focused on the western United States, and
California in particular, we have tried to cite works on southern Australia (49),
South Africa (39), and Chile (10). Rather than cover other areas haphazardly, we
punted and leave to other researchers the important task of making cross-country
comparisons and understanding the link between an area’s historical context and
its institutional development of water markets.
Considering that supply augmentation was the main strategy through the 1970s,
water markets are less than 30 years old. For droughts in the short term and
urban growth in the long term, the need for trading to efficiently allocate water
will only grow. Effective, appropriate water markets will only emerge with the
development of laws and institutions that address transaction costs and third-party
effects. Combined with water conservation on the demand side (77), water markets
are an integral option for allocating scarce water.
The Annual Review of Environment and Resources is online at
http://environ.annualreviews.org
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